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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent. : Case No. 19559 
• 
vs. : 
JOSEPH P. ROCCO, : Priority 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of capital homicide in 
the Second District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987). 
STATMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did defendant waive any objection to the 
photographs of the victim when he stated at trial that one of the 
photographs was admissible but failed to specify which one was 
not admissible and by failing to include the photographs in the 
record on appeal? 
2. Was defendant prejudiced by admission of prior bad 
acts or subsequent bad acts where the evidence was highly 
probative of defendant's intent, knowledge and lack of mistake or 
accident? 
3. Did the trial court err by failing to admonish the 
jury of the purpose for Rule 55 evidence where there is no 
authority requiring such an admonition? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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4. Was there prosecutorial misconduct requiring 
reversal of defendant's conviction where the evidence of 
defendant's guilt through his own statements was overwhelming? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with numerous crimes 
arising from a crime spree on February 1, 1983. The trial court 
severed all counts from the first-degree homicide charge which 
was tried July 6, 1983 through August 9, 1983 before the 
Honorable Calvin S. Gould, in the Second Judicial District Court, 
in and for Weber County. The jury convicted defendant of first-
degree murder on August 9, 1983. On September 8, 1983 Judge 
Gould sentenced defendant to life in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant and David Hanson burned David Stewart's 
Riverdale home down around him on the night of February 1, 1983 
(R. 797, 805, 1448). Stewart, who was bound hand and foot, was 
burned beyond recognition when defendant and Hanson splashed from 
3 to 5 gallons of a thin, flammable liquid over Stewart and 
trailed it across the floor, then lit it (R. 812-13, 930, 937, 
1227). Stewart died from extensive thermal burns (R. 1194). His 
dentist identified him from dental work he recognized as his own 
(R. 1222). 
At trial, there was much confusion over the manner in 
which Stewart was tied and over what became of Stewart's left 
hand and forearm. Officer Morgan said Stewart's right hand was 
wrapped with wire and also his legs, just below the knees (R. 
812-13, 826-27). He said there was no evidence Stewart was 
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"hogtied" (R. 824-25). Detective Fuchs said Stewart was 
"hogtied". He explained that an electrical wire, probably an 
extension cord, was wrapped around Stewart's ankles and then 
brought up behind him and wrapped around his right wrists, 
drawing his legs up (R. 860-61, 864). Fuchs thought the wrist 
wrapping was loose enough that it could have accommodated 
Stewart's left hand, if it were there (R. 864). Dr. Reyser also 
said that there was copper wire around Stewart's right wrist and 
his ankles (R. 1196). She said that at one time the wire had 
been quite tight because skin tissue was preserved underneath it 
on the wrist (R. 1213). She did not agree that there was room 
for another wrist within the wire (R. 1213). 
Stewart's left hand and forearm were never found (R. 
811, 886). His body laid on its left side when he was found (R. 
863). Underneath his body, remnants of a red ski parka were 
preserved because it was protected from the fire by his body (R. 
873, 935). The carpet underneath his body was also protected. 
(R. 879, 935). A ring that Stewart wore on his left ring finger 
was not found with the body (R. 780). These facts lead to an 
inference that Stewart's arm was cut off before he was burned. 
Two photographs of the body were introduced (R. 811-
12). One of these showed the manner in which Stewart was tied 
(R. 860-61). The other showed debris over and around the body 
which is obscured by smoke and Stewart's feet which were 
described both as wearing boots and as being bare, but charred 
(R. 842, 866-68). 
-**-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
To establish defendant's intent to kill, the State 
introduced his confession and evidence of an attempted murder 
just moments after Stewart's house burned. Defendant said that 
after what happened at Stewart's, he was just drunk enough that 
he -wanted to go ahead and do it again" (R. 1450-51). Defendant 
suggested to Hanson that they go to Neil Shock's home where they 
kicked the front door in, tied Shock up on his bed with a vacuum 
cleaner or electric blanket cord and lit the bed on fire (R. 
1147, 1451-53). Shock, who rolled off the bed before it was lit 
on fire, managed to escape his burning bedroom (R. 1149, 1154). 
Shock thought he smelled kerosene before the fire started and it 
appeared that 1-2 quarts of flammable liquid was splashed on 
Shock's bed and floor (R. 1158, 1167). 
Defendant and Hanson took Shock's car from his home (R. 
1152, 1456). They decided to get rid of the car by burning it in 
Ogden Canyon and used one-half to one gallon of a flammable 
liquid to start the fire which completely gutted the car's 
interior (R. 1170, 1456-57). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Defendant waived any objection to the photographs 
by failing to specify in the record which photograph he referred 
to as inadmissible. He stated he had no objection to one of the 
two photographs but failed to identify which one was which on the 
record. Further, the photographs are not part of the record on 
appeal for this Court to review. 
Moreover, the photographs were of essential evidentiary 
value because one of them depicted the manner in which the victim 
-4-
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was bound. An issue that was hotly contested by defendant. The 
witnesses' testimony on this issue was contradictory and 
confusing. Viewing the photograph became necessary for the jury 
to settle this factual dispute which bore significantly on 
defendant's mental state. 
II. The State did not offer evidence of the Goodwin 
burglary in its case. The prosecutor mentioned the burglary in 
his opening statement but failed to introduce evidence on the 
issue during trial, thus, the issue of whether this was 
misconduct meriting reversal is treated in Point IV. 
Officer Carpenter's mention that defendant knew 
something about two ski resort burglaries was not evidence that 
defendant committed those burglaries. Even if the jury inferred 
that defendant committed those burglaries, defendant was not 
prejudiced because there is no reasonable likelhihood of a more 
favorable outcome. 
The evidence of defendant's involvement in an attempted 
murder and arson at Neil Shock's home immediately after the 
Stewart murder was highly probative on the issue of defendant's 
intent and tended to prove absence of accident in the Hansen 
murder and knowledge on defendant's part. This evidence was 
properly admitted under former Rule 45. 
III. Defendant fails to identify what evidence was 
admitted in violation of former Rule 55 and has# therefore, 
waived any objection he might have had by failing to provide 
legal analysis on the issue. Even if defendant had been more 
specific, he admits that the evidence was admissible and claims 
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only that the jury should have been given a limiting instruction. 
Defendant, however, fails to cite to any Utah authority requiring 
such an instruction. 
IV. Defendant was not prejudiced by any alleged 
misconduct of the prosecutor because evidence of his guilt was 
overwhelming. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO THE 
PHOTOGRAPHS ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
At trial, the State introduced two photographs of the 
victim known as Exhibits J and K (R. 811-12). These photographs 
depicted the body of the victim as it appeared at the crime scene 
upon discovery and after it had been rolled over onto a body bag 
(R. 855, 860). On appeal, defendant argues that the prejudicial 
effect of the photos outweighed their probative value and that 
their admission was reversible error. As demonstrated below, 
defendant's argument fails because he waived any objection he 
might have had by failing to make a sufficiently specific 
objection and by failing to include the photos in the record on 
appeal. 
When the State offered the photos, defendant stated 
that he had no objection to one of the photos but failed to 
specify which one (R. 814). He went on to state that he thought 
the cumulative effect of two photos was prejudicial and without 
probative value. Id. Again, defendant did not state to which of 
the two photos he objected. When the court admitted both, 
defendant reiterated that he did not object to one of them but 
did not specify to which one he did object (R. 815). 
- f i -
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After the State rested, defendant renewed his argument 
about the photographs through a motion for mistrial (R. 1503-06). 
Again defendant did not specify which photograph should not have 
been admitted. Instead, defendant shifted his focus claiming 
that no photos should have been allowed because they served 
merely to inflame the jury. Neither did defendant's written 
Motion for Mistrial and supporting memorandum (R. 557, 567, 572-
74# 589) explain that he objected to one of the photos in 
particular. 
From the record, it appears that the trial court may 
have known which photograph defendant found objectionable because 
defense counsel was referring to the photos as "this one" and 
"that one." (R. 814, 815). This Court, however, cannot 
determine from the record with any degree of certainty to which 
photograph defendant preserved an objection. 
Moreover, because neither photo is part of the record 
on appeal, this Court cannot even examine them. Nevertheless, 
even if both photographs were part of the appellate record, this 
Court remains unable to determine to which photograph defendant 
objected. Any attempt to do so would be sheer speculation. 
Because defendant failed to make a specific objection 
on the record to sufficiently preserve the issue for review, he 
has waived any objection he might have had. State v. Kelly, 718 
P.2d 385, 393 (Utah 1986) (Court will generally assume validity 
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of trial court's actions where record is not entirely clear). 
Also, defendant's failure to perfect the record on appeal should 
operate as a waiver of the issue for appeal in any event. State 
v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771 (Utah 1985). 
Finally, despite defendant's contrary assertion, the 
photographs did possess essential evidentiary value. See State 
v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986). Several witnesses 
testified about the manner in which Stewart's body was bound. 
These witnesses presented a confusing scenario wherein the right 
arm either was or was not connected by wire to the ankles or 
knees, the wire around the wrists was loose enough to accommodate 
a second wrist or it was not, and that the wire between the 
ankles or knees and the wrist was cut at the scene before the 
photo was taken or was cut at the autopsy (R. 812-13, 824-27, 
860-61, 864, 1196, 1213). 
Evidence of the manner in which Stewart was found 
illustrated the intent to kill in the care taken to ensure his 
inability to escape. It also was relevant to whether his left 
arm was burned away by the fir€* or was severed prior to the fire 
or perhaps prior to his being bound. This also illustrated the 
intent with which his assailants acted and eliminated the 
possibility of accidental death. 
Defendant argues that the photographs do not depict the 
crime scene because Stewart was moved before one of them was 
taken. However, this photograph was described by a witness as 
being taken at the scene, showing the body in the condition it 
was in at the scene except that it had been turned over (R. 855). 
-8-
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The witness pointed out the ligatures and noted their locations 
using the photograph to illustrate his testimony (R. 860-861). 
That the body was moved only increases the photograph's probative 
value because the photograph was apparently intended to 
illustrate evidence that could be viewed only if the body was 
moved. 
Again, it is important to note that the photograph is 
not contained in the record and defendant merely alleges that it 
has no value without citing to any record evidence to support his 
claim. A noted above, one witness used the photograph to 
illustrate portions of his testimony that was disputed by other 
witnesses. The jury was free to inspect the photograph and 
determine whether it did or, as defendant claims, did not clearly 
show the position of the ligatures, their relative tightness and 
whether they were connected. 
With respect to the admission of photographic evidence, 
this Court in State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983), set forth 
the following rule: 
We have frequently stated and applied the 
rule that color photographs of the body of 
the victim—even photographs that are 
gruesome—are no inadmissible if they are 
probative of essential facts, even though 
they may be cumulative of other evidence. 
663 P.2d at 63. The Court added that "the key consideration in 
the application of this rule has been the relevance of the 
photographs.- Jd. Finally, it stated that the relevance of the 
proposed photographs must be weighed against the risk of creating 
undue prejudice: 
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[T]he court should determine whether the 
viewing of the photographs by the jury would 
create a substantial danger of undue 
prejudice against the defendant, and if so, 
whether that danger substantially outweighs 
the photographs' essential evidentiary value. 
The more inflammatory the photograph, the 
greater the need to establish its essential 
evidentiary value, Commonwealth v. 
Scaramuzzino, 455 Pa. at 381, 317 A.2d at 
226, and, conversely, the more essential the 
evidentiary value of the photograph, the 
greater the defendant's burden to require its 
exclusion on the basis that its inflammatory 
nature would be prejudicial to him. The 
point of the reference to "essential 
evidentiary value" in the context of 
potentially prejudicial photographs of the 
victim's body is that such photographs would 
generally be inappropriate where the only 
relevant evidence they convey can be put 
before the jury readily and accurately by 
other means not accompanied by the potential 
prejudice. 
663 P.2d at 64 (emphasis in original). 
As to the other photograph, defendant does not direct 
any particular argument to it but merely claims generally that it 
was inadmissible. Without the photograph, it is difficult for 
anyone to determine exactly what it depicts since there is no 
testimony relating to it that clearly establishes anything except 
that Stewart's feet are visible, the view is obscured by smoke 
and his body is at least partially covered by debris (R. 842). 
From this record it appears that the photograph was not 
particularly gruesome and that the State was not required to 
establish the high degree of probativeness required for gruesome 
photographs. See State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752-53 (Utah 
1986). 
Because defendant failed to preserve his objection at 
trial, he may prevail on appeal only if admission of the 
-10-
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photographs was plain error. State v. Poef 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 
P.2d 512 (1968). It is again important to consider that 
defendant stated on the record that he had no objection to 
admission of one of the photographs. Such a waiver should stand 
even in the face of a claim of plain error. 
Even if admission of both photographs was plain error, 
it was harmless given the evidence of guilt produced at trial. 
Plain error is reversible only where there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a different result without the error. State v. 
Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 30 (filed Feb. 3, 1988). A 
reasonable likelihood is established where the likelihood of a 
different result is sufficiently high to undermine this Court's 
confidence in the verdict. Jd. In this case, the evidence 
pointing to defendant's guilt included his own statements that he 
was present at Stewart's on the night of his death and that he 
wanted to "go ahead and do it again" to Neil Shock. The evidence 
of the degree of the crime included evidence of intentional 
murder in that Stewart was tied such that he was completely 
unable to flee the burning house, that a large quantity of 
flammable liquid was used to ignite the fire, and that a portion 
of Stewart's arm was missing from his body. Given this evidence, 
there is little likelihood the jury would have reached a 
different result without the photographs. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADMIT CHARACTER 
EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE. 
Defendant argues in Points II and III of his brief that 
the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his bad character 
to show that he had a propensity to commit murder by arson. 
Defendant's analysis of what occurred at trial and the nature of 
the evidence actually admitted is flawed in several respects. 
His first complaint is that the State offered evidence 
of a burglary, known as the Goodwin burglary, that occurred on 
the same day Stewart died. However, the State did not offer 
evidence of this crime. Prior to trial, defendant moved to sever 
all other charges against him, including the Goodwin burglary, 
from the first degree murder charge (R. 700). Initially, the 
trial court severed only a burglary charge known as the Snow 
Basin burglary that occurred several days prior to the Stewart 
murder (R. 712-13). After jury selection had begun, but before 
the parties had exercised their peremptory challenges, the judge 
announced that he was reconsidering the motion to sever (R. 730). 
After some discussion about the State's theory of the case, the 
judge indicated that he would sever the other charges so that 
they would not be read to the jury but the State could introduce 
whatever evidence was relevant to the first degree murder charge 
even if it was also evidence of another crime (R. 737-39). 
During his opening statement, the prosecutor explained 
the State's theory of the case including a reference to the 
Goodwin burglary. It was the State's theory that defendant and 
his co-defendant obtained the gun they used at the Stewart home 
-12-
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and at the Shock home from the Goodwin burglary earlier in the 
day. (See Appendix A.) The State did not later, however, 
present any testimony or other evidence regarding the source of 
the gun or make any further reference to the Goodwin burglary. 
The prosecutor told the jury that his opening statement was not 
evidence to be considered by them in deciding the case (R. 741). 
Since the State did not offer evidence of the Goodwin burglary, 
the issue is really whether the prosecutor committed prejudicial 
misconduct by referring to the Goodiwn burglary in his opening 
statement when no evidence of the burglary was offered during 
trial. This issue is treated in Point IV, infra. 
Defendant's second complaint is the following exchange 
during direct examination of Officer Terry Carpenter: 
Q [By Mr. Hughes] Let me go back to where we 
were coming down the canyon. Can you outline 
for me the esssence of that conversation, 
what was said; what was asked and what the 
responses were? 
A. The essence of it initially, the only 
thing that Mr. Rocco knew about that, he was 
willing to tell us about, was a burglary that 
occurred at Nordic Valley and Snow Basin Ski 
Resorts. He told us about that. 
(R. 1429.) Defendant immediately objected and moved for a 
mistrial which the court took under advisement (R. 1429-36). 
Defendant renewed the motion after the close of the State's case 
(R. 1494) and the court denied the motion (R. 1505). 
While it is true that Judge Gould ruled that these 
particular burglaries were inadmissible and irrelevant, the issue 
here is whether the State offered evidence that defendant 
committed these crimes and whether defendant was prejudiced by 
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what the jury heard. The trial judge ruled that he did not feel 
that the jury was improperly influenced by Officer Carpenter's 
statement. It was not asserted before the jury that defendant 
committed these crimes, only that he said he knew something about 
them. The jury could easily have inferred only that defendant 
had information about these crimes that he was willing to share 
with the officers. This does not necessarily lead to a 
conclusion that defendant committed the crimes. It was not, 
therefore, a clear abuse of discretion to deny defendant's motion 
for a mistrial. C.f. State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah 
1982) (references to debt owed by defendant to State Narcotics 
did not unduly prejudice jury to perceive defendant as hardened 
criminal). 
Finally, defendant argues that evidence of his 
subsequent bad acts committed at Neil Shock's home and evidence 
that Mr. Shock's car was burned should have been excluded as 
"unreliable" evidence. (Br. of App. at 13-14). Defendant 
admits, however, that former Utah Rule of Evidence 55 allowed the 
admission of evidence "to prove some other material fact 
including absence of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity." The burglary 
of Mr. Shock's home, the burning of his bed after he was bound 
with electrical wire and lying near the bed, and the burning of 
his vehicle were highly probative of defendant's guilt in this 
case. 
Combined with defendant's own statement that he 
i 
suggested going to Shock's home and that he wanted to go and "do 
-14-
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it again,H the evidence tying defendant to the burning of Shock's 
home after he was bound with electrical cord was relevant to 
demonstrate that defendant knew what happened to Stewart and, in 
fact, participated intentionally rather than that he was unaware 
what Hansen was doing and wanted to save Stewart as defendant 
claimed. Because the probative value of the evidence was 
extremely high, the trial court properly ruled that the potential 
prejudice was outweighed by the probative value under former Utah 
Rule of Evidence 45. 
The burning of Shock's car in the canyon after the 
burglaries was admissible as "circumstantial evidence of 
consciousness of guilt...." which was accepted by this Court in 
State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60, 65 (Utah 1983) citing McCormick's 
Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 271 (2d ed. 1972). Defendant's 
admission that he participated in this activity was evidence from 
which the jury could infer that defendant wa aware of and 
intended the result of the fire set earlier in the evening at 
Stewart's home and that he was attempting to destroy evidence 
that would have implicated him in that crime. Thus, the trial 
court properly admitted this evidence. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY ON THE PURPOSE OF THE ADMISSION OF 
RULE 55 EVIDENCE AND, THEREFORE, COMMITTED NO 
ERROR BY FAILING TO GIVE SUCH AN ADMONITION. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing 
to restrict the admission of certain evidence allegedly admitted 
as an exception to former Rule 55 Utah R. Evid. (1981). However, 
defendant fails to cite to the record to support this assignment 
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of error or to demonstrate that he preserved the issue for 
appeal• Defendant omits all record reference to any particular 
evidence which he finds objectionable, referring to such evidence 
under the general rubric of "exception to Rule 55 evidence." In 
addition, while defendant claims that he raised objections and 
requested restrictions to the admissibility of such evidence, he 
fails to cite to the record in support of such assertions. 
Under these circumstances, this Court should assume the 
correctness of the trial court's judgment and affirm defendant's 
conviction. State v. Barella, 714 P.2d 287, 288 (Utah 1986); 
State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986); State v. Sutton, 707 
P.2d 681, 683 (Utah 1985); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6). Because 
"[t]he burden of showing error is on the party who seeks to upset 
the judgment," State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982), 
the State should not be put to the task of developing defendant's 
legal arguments by searching through the record and making 
references thereto in support of defendant's factual allegations. 
The obligation to direct the Court to pertinent parts of the 
record falls upon defendant, not the State. 
Even if, in spite of his failure to cite to the record 
and specify the factual basis for his claim, this Court reviews 
defendant's argument, defendant fails to show where the trial 
court's error lies. Defendant does not argue that the evidence 
in question was inadmissible. On the contrary, defendant 
acknowledges that it falls within former Rule 55 Utah R. Evid. 
(1981) (in force at the time of trial). Defendant's contention 
is that the trial court should have admonished the jury, at the 
16-
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time the evidence was introduced, that such evidence was 
admissible only for a limited purpose. 
Rule 55 permits the introduction of evidence of a 
party's criminal wrongs committed on another occasion so long as 
it is relevant to establish a material fact of the present 
offense and it is introduced for purposes other than to show the 
party's criminal disposition. Utah R. Evid. Rule 55 (1981); 
State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah 1982). Nothing in 
the rule requires that the trial court admonish or restrict the 
jury as to the purpose of admitting the evidence. Nor is there 
Utah case law in support of defendant's contentions. 
Defendant finds support for his position in Montana 
case law which imposes a strict procedural check on the admission 
of evidence under Rule 404(6) Mont. R. Evid., which is in essence 
identical to Utah R. Evid. 55 (1981). However, Montana's strict 
requirement derives from an interpretation of the rule which is 
diametrically opposed to this Court's interpretation of the same 
rule. State v. Just, 602 P.2d 957 (Mont. 1979) interpreted Rule 
404(b) Mont. R. Evid. by incorporating Montana's common law 
principles regarding the admissibility of evidence of a party's 
bad acts as follows: 
Generally, evidence of other offenses or of 
other similar acts at other times is 
inadmissible for the purpose of showing the 
commission of the particular crime. . . . 
The general rule, however, is subject to 
several exceptions. 
Id. at 960 (citations omitted). Based on this interpretation of 
the rule, Montana's general rule is one of exclusion of such 
evidence. Thus in Just the Court stated: 
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We are concerned, nevertheless, with the 
possibility that the exceptions . . . may 
"swallow up" the general rule . . . As we 
have stated: "The general rule should be 
strictly enforced in all cases where 
applicable • . . The exceptions should be 
carefully limited/ and their number and scope 
not increased." 
Id. at 962 (citations omitted). Therefore, based on its general 
policy to restrict the introduction of evidence which constitutes 
an exception to the rule, the Supreme Court of Montana requires 
that the court admonish and instruct the jury of the limited 
purpose of evidence of a party's bad acts. 
Utah does not share Montana's general policy of 
restriction and therefore/ this Court need not adopt the same 
strict procedural checks on the introduction of Rule 55 evidence. 
In State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah 1982), this Court 
interpreted Rule 55 Utah R. Evid. (1981) as follows: 
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence . . . 
has syntax at odds with its substance. Its 
syntax suggests a general rule followed by 
exceptions, but an examination of its 
substance reveals an exception followed by a 
general rule followed by illustrations. 
Consequently, Utah's general policy with regard to the 
admission of other offenses evidence differs from Montana's. In 
Forsyth, this Court reaffirmed Utah's policy of inclusion as 
follows: 
Any pertinent fact which throws light upon 
the subject under judicial consideration, the 
accused's guilt or innocence of the crime for 
which he is charged is admissible. Such fact 
is not to be excluded merely because it may 
also prove or tend to prove that the accused 
has committed another similar crime. 
Relevant and material evidence does not 
become irrelevant or immaterial merely 
because it points to other offenses. 
-18-
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J^. at 1175 (citing from State v. Harries, 118 Utah 260, 283-284, 
221 P.2d 605, 617 (1950)). 
Contrary to Montana's interpretation, this Court has 
interpreted Rule 55 Utah R. Evid. (1980) as a rule of inclusion 
favoring presentation of other criminal or civil wrongs to 
establish guilt or innocence of the charged offense. Therefore, 
absent any statutory or case authority requirement, the trial 
court did not err by not admonishing the jury to restrict the 
purpose of the evidence in question. 
Finally, defendant's reliance on State v. Valdez, 432 
P.2d 53 (Utah 1967) is unfounded. In that case, the defendant 
argued that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury 
as to the limited consideration of the evidence of other 
offenses, in addition to the court's admonition to the jury at 
the time of introduction. There this Court held that generally 
the admonition was sufficient. Id. at 55. The Court did not 
hold that such admonition is necessary. 
Defendant also claims he could not request a limiting 
jury instruction because the trial court had not previously 
admonished the jury on the limited use of the evidence. This 
claim has no merit and is merely an attempt to avoid the waiver 
applied by this Court in Valdez. Defendant clearly could have 
requested such an instruction and his failure to do so waives his 
objection on appeal. 
In conclusion, defendant has failed to set forth any 
grounds for error in the trial court's failure to admonish the 
jury as to the restricted purpose for which the evidence was 
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POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED 
FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT WHERE DEFENDANT 
WAS NOT PREJUDICED BY ANY ALLEGED MISCONDUCT. 
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor failed to 
exercise the "scrupulous care" required by State v. Brown/ 607 
P.2d 261# 271 (Utah 1980) in capital cases. He urges that this 
failure prejudiced him but does not acknowledge that he admitted 
being at Stewart's home the night of Stewart's death# knowing 
that the Stewart home was engulfed by flames when he left, 
wanting to "go ahead and do it again" at Neil Shocks', and 
helping to conceal evidence of the crime spree by burning Shock's 
car (R. 1450-51/ 1456-57). These factors demonstrate that/ 
although the prosecutor went somewhat overboard in his argument 
in reference to the photographs and should not have mentioned the 
Goodwin burglary if he did not plan to present proof of the 
conduct/ defendant was not unfairly prejudiced. 
First/ defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the 
prosecutor's opening statement which mentioned that the gun used 
during the Stewart murder was obtained through burglarizing the 
Goodwin home earlier in the day. Concededly/ there seems to have 
been no reason that the State needed to prove where the gun was 
obtained to prove that Hansen carried one and that defendant knew 
it since defendant/ in his own statement/ admitted that Hansen 
had a gun. However/ the jury was told that the prosecutor's 
statement was not evidence (R. 741). It is unlikely from what 
the prosecutor said that the jury was biased since they did not 
impose the death penalty and defendant's own statement implicates 
-20-
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him in the murder. Thus, the fact that the Goodwin burglary was 
something the jury would not have been justified in considering 
is insufficient for reversal because it does not undermine 
confidence in the jury's verdict. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 
1239, 1255 (Utah 1988). 
Next, defendant complains about Officer Burch's 
description of the circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest. 
He urges that the jury was impressed that defendant was a "very 
dangerous and bad person, even though there were no circumstances 
apparent in the arrest that would substantiate the probativeness 
of such testimony." (Br. of App. at 22.). He does not explain 
what exactly were the prejudicial matters described by Burch. 
Given defendant's failure of specificity, his claim is specious. 
No doubt, the prosecutor elicited testimony about the 
circumstances of the arrest to establish a foundation for the 
voluntariness of defendant's statements made while riding away 
from the arrest scene. An issue that was challenged by defendant 
(See R. 1298-1324, specifically R. 1308). 
Thirdly, defendant asserts that there was misconduct in 
the prosecutor's rebuttal argument when he apparently displayed a 
photograph of Stewart, alive and well, and contrasted it with one 
of the photographs taken of Stewart's corpse. As this Court 
noted in Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1258, several courts have 
recognized that the probative value of photographs showing the 
victim before death is often weak. In this case, however, the 
photograph was harmless because, as discussed above, there was 
overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt as there was in 
Lafferty. 
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Finally, defendant complains that the State failed to 
offer the trial court guidance on the issue of severance of the 
crimes charged. It is difficult to see what defendant's point is 
in this regard because the judge did sever the charges for trial 
and defendant was not, therefore, prejudiced by joinder in the 
information. Because the evidence of some of these offenses was 
relevant and highly probative of defendant's mental state at the 
Stewart home, it was properly admitted at trial even though the 
court determined that the charges should be separately tried as 
argued in Point II above. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm defendant's conviction. 
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what happened in the life of Joe Rocco from the evening of 
February 1st until the morning of February 3rd of this year. 
What we are going to be demonstrating for you is that on 
February 1st he got off work as a ski lift operator at Snow 
Basin, and drove down the canyon with another man named David 
Hansen. You will hear a lot about David Hansen before the 
trial is over as well. Sometime in the early evening Joe Rocco 
and David Hansen ended up at the Billy Goodwin residence in Roy.| 
No one was home. The door was kicked in. The two men took 
guns, they took property, money, miscellaneous other items 
and left. They ultimately ended up at a place in Riverdale. 
MR. DIUMENTI: Your Honor, for the record, I object 
to counsel's reference to the Goodwin matter during opening 
statement. 
THE COURT: Noted and overruled. 
MR. HUGHES: They ended up in Riverdale, the home of 
a man named David Stewart. 
You will learn a lot about David Stewart before the trial ijs 
over as well. At that residence, I am not sure if you are 
familiar with the Classic Waterslide, or where the viaduct goes 
over Riverdale Road, there is a couple of homes back down 
that dirt road. Some of you may be familiar with the area, 
the old Sherwood Forest area. David Stewart occupied a home 
there. They arrived there. Mr. Stewart was bound by electrical] 
wire, was bound—his feet were bound by the electric wire, and 
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